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Abstract Gender segregation in the public domain has become a cornerstone of the
Saudi interpretation of Islam (Doumato 2009). It is a development that has led to the
coming about of extensive separate public spaces that are only for women (Doumato
2009; Hamdan 2005; Le Renard 2008, 2014). In these women-only public spaces,
women undertake activities that are by them and for them, therewith reinforcing the
existence of these separate structures. This institutionalisation and practice of women-
only public spaces, as well as its opposite phenomenon of ‘mixing’ between the two
sexes (ikhtilāṭ) however is contested and led to a heated debate. This debate centres
around the question of whether and if so, how women should participate in the public
domain. Starting with an overview of the historical development of women-only public
spaces and ikhtilāṭ in Saudi Arabia, I will show how these have evolved. Drawing on
fieldwork among urban, educated Saudi women, I shed light on how attitudes and
strategies of female respondents regarding women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ are
related to their ideas about their presence in the public domain and notions of ‘the
liberation of women’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘the rise of women’. I conclude by dem-
onstrating how ideas about the participation of women in the public sphere are
positioned as part of the construction of a local, ‘enchanted’ modernity (Deeb, 2006)
that has a material and a spiritual dimension.
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Introduction
In March 2010, Dr. Yusef al-Ahmad, a professor of Islamic jurisprudence at Imam
Muhammad bin Sa‘ud Islamic University in Riyadh, called for demolishing part of the
Grand Mosque in Mecca and subsequently constructing separate floors for women in
the mosque, so that men and women would be prevented from mixing of the sexes
(ikhtilāṭ) during ṭawāf1 and prayer. Dr. al-Ahmad’s proposal was met with both consent
(endorsing the practice of gender segregation) and criticism (favouring ikhtilāṭ). Al-
Ahmad’s statement illustrates the debate about mixing of the sexes that was taking
place in Saudi Arabia during the time of research (2010–2011), with some being as
strongly in favour of segregation in the public domain as others are in favour of ikhtilāṭ
(Foley 2010; Meijer 2010). Central to this debate is the question whether and if so, how
women should participate in the public domain.
Gender segregation in the public domain has become a cornerstone of the Saudi
interpretation of Islam (Doumato 2009). The gender segregation in the public domain
that has come about in Saudi Arabia does not relegate women’s participation to the
realm of domesticity, but rather separates men and women in the public domain. As
such, it is a development that has led to the coming about of extensive separate public
spaces that are only for women (al-Rasheed 2013; Doumato 2009; Hamdan 2005;
Le Renard 2008 and Le Renard 2014). In these women-only public spaces, women
undertake activities that are by them and for them, thereby reinforcing the existence of
these separate structures. This institutionalisation and practice of women-only public
spaces, as its opposite of ikhtilāṭ, do not go uncontested.
Starting with an overview of the historical development of women-only public
spaces and ikhtilāṭ, I will show how these have evolved. Subsequently, this article will
disentangle the ideas, attitudes and strategies of interviewed women themselves on the
issue of their own participation in Saudi Arabia’s public spaces. Then, I examine
interlocutors’ ideas about ‘empowerment’ and ‘the rise of women’ and how these are
related to the concepts of women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ. I conclude by
demonstrating how ideas about the participation of women in the public sphere are
positioned as part of the construction of a local, ‘enchanted’ modernity (Deeb, 2006)
that has a material and a spiritual dimension.
Methodology
This article is the result of my participation in the Saudi Arabia project of the Islam
Research Programme (IRP) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the research
project on Saudi Arabia, three themes were chosen. These are intellectual trends and
debates, civil society, and the position of women. My research concerned the ‘position
of women’ theme and dealt with the challenges and opportunities that interlocutors
experience regarding ikhtilāṭ and gender segregation, as apparent in public spaces that
are ‘only for women’. This article is an adaptation of the section on the position of
women in the IRP Saudi Arabia research report ‘Saudi Arabia between Conservatism,
1 Circumbulation of the Ka‘ba (a cubic building inside the Great Mosque of Mecca which is the holiest place
of Islam) during hajj (Muslim pilgrimage).
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Accommodation and Reform’, published by the Clingendael Institute in 2012 (Aarts
and Meijer 2012). Paul Aarts, Dr. Roel Meijer, and Prof. Dr. Karin van Nieuwkerk
developed the initial research proposal for the overall IRP project on Saudi Arabia. The
local partner institute of the IRP project was the King Faisal Institute for Research and
Islamic Studies in Riyadh (KFCRIS), who generously hosted me during my fieldwork.
For this article, I also draw on insights gained during my PhD research on the same
topic.
For this study, I interviewed a total of 48 women. Fieldwork took place in June
2010, January 2011, and September 2011. The majority of interviews were formal
interviews that followed an interview protocol and took place in public areas such as
malls and coffee shops, in homes, or in offices. Other interviews took place more
informally, such as chance encounters in a clothes shop or during a visit to a theme
park. Interviews took place in Arabic or in English, depending on the interlocutor’s
preference.
The focus of the research were urban women, most of whom were well-educated
and well-travelled. Not all had a command of English. The categories of women that I
interviewed were young working women, female students, businesswomen, female
Islamic preachers and teachers (hereafter called da‘iyāt) and women who work on
women’s issues (hereafter called activists). They all lived in cities (Riyadh, Jeddah, and
Dammam).
The rationale for choosing these categories of interlocutors is that they all have taken
on an active role in the public domain and as such navigate and have experience with
the issues at hand. For that reason, and because it would have been difficult to gain
access to them during the short fieldwork periods, I did not include the category of non-
urban women.
During the first, nine-month phase of the research project (2010) the focus was on
desk research, which consisted of evaluating the historical development of women-only
public spaces, and fieldwork. In June 2010, I carried out fieldwork in Saudi Arabia and
interviewed sixteen female students and fourteen young working women about their
views and experiences regarding the possibilities and constraints of women-only public
spaces and ikhtilāṭ. All interlocutors were young women who have an active role in the
public domain. Three interviews took place in Riyadh, twenty-seven in Jeddah. The
majority of interviews were carried out in Arabic and none of the interviews were
voice-recorded.
In the final stages of phase one, consultation with Saudi scholars helped refine the
research questions and research design for phase two. During the second phase
(January–December 2011) of the research project, I conducted in-depth interviews with
women who have reached a settled position in society. The three focus categories were
businesswomen, activists, and da‘iyāt. These are all women who have an active role in
the public domain.
In January 2011, I carried out two weeks of fieldwork in Riyadh and interviewed
nine women: three activists, three da‘iyāt, and three businesswomen. All interviews
were formal, voice-recorded interviews. In September 2011, I carried out four days of
fieldwork in Jeddah and the Eastern Province and interviewed nine women: again three
activists, three da‘iyāt, and three businesswomen. As in January 2011, all interviews
were formal, voice-recorded interviews, and the majority of interviews were carried out
in Arabic. In phase two, I interviewed a total of eighteen women, leading to a total
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number of forty-eight interviewed women for phases one and two together. In this
article, all women have been given a pseudonym.
During my fieldwork I was supported by Saudi research assistants. Assistance
consisted of making contacts, helping me find my bearings in Saudi Arabia, and
literature search. Key informants were researchers at KFCRIS in Riyadh, one of the
Saudi experts who had been involved in phase one of the project, and a Saudi
acquaintance. After this initial access to the research field, I relied on referrals (the
so-called ‘snowball sampling’) while bearing in mind not to ‘linger’ within one specific
group and ensuring an even spread over the categories of women that were chosen as
the project’s focus.
The research is based on anthropological, qualitative methods such as interviews and
did not employ large-scale quantitative methods. The sample size is very small,
particularly when broken down by profession, and does not allow me to responsibly
draw meaningful conclusions based on that marker. Therefore, I have chosen a different
approach, and the analysis in this article focuses on the linguistic means of referring to
‘gender mixing’ and ‘gender segregation’, as well as the arguments interlocutors use to
position themselves towards those phenomena.
The history of women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ
The development of women-only public spaces is connected to the Saudi state’s
enrichment after the discovery and exploitation of oil, and, as Le Renard has argued,
‘governmental discourses, including laws, measures, and policies, have served to
perpetuate and consolidate the principle of gender segregation’ (Le Renard 2008: 611).
Important factors influencing the position of women and supporting stricter and new
forms of public gender segregation were the discovery and exploitation of oil, the
process of urbanisation, and the rise of the revivalist Islamic Awakening movement2
and its discourse on segregation. These developments will be examined in the sections
below, taking the proclamation of the (third) Saudi state in 1932, when the kingdoms of
the Najd and the Hejaz were unified into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as a starting
point. Not long after unification, in 1938, oil was discovered.
Oil and urbanisation
The discovery of oil in 1938 and its subsequent exploitation led to the gradual
development of wealth in Saudi Arabia in the 1940s. Early in the 1940s, the first oil
wealth enabled, more than before, some elite families from Jeddah to spend time in i.e.
Egypt. The experience abroad changed amongst others elitist people’s views on girls’
2 The Islamic Awakening movement (ṣahwa islamiyya or ṣahwa) in Saudi Arabia first emerged in the 1960s
and gripped Saudi universities in the 1970s and 1980s, while it rose to prominence in the 1980s. Saudis who
were part of the Islamic Awakening movement combined their traditional Salafi theology with the ideas of the
Muslim Brotherhood about political matters. These ideas had taken hold in the Islamic Awakening movement
through members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had sought refuge in Saudi Arabia due to persecution by
their Ba‘thist and Nasserist governments. See also ICG, 2004. Other (regional) developments such as the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran also influenced the politicisation of Saudi
Islam.
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education. Al-Torki describes how upon return to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1940s some
elite families would enrol their daughters in informal schools, where they would learn
needlework and basic arithmetic, and would memorise passages from the Qur’an
(Al-Torki 1986: 19).
The Ministry of Education was founded in 1953 with public schools for boys (not
girls) opening for the first time in that year (Al-Munajjed 1997: 60). During the 1950s
an increase in popular demand for formal girls’ education started to emerge. Some
young Saudi men who had been educated abroad expressed their need for ‘education-
ally compatible wives’ (Al-Munajjed 1997: 61). In 1955, the Dar al-Hanan school in
Jeddah was the first private school for girls to open in Saudi Arabia.
Some religious scholars (‘ulama’) however, opposed girls’ education, claiming that
education would corrupt girls’ morals and destroy the foundations of the Saudi Muslim
family. Nevertheless, backed by the increasing income from oil, king Faisal (r. 1964–
75) ‘made the education of girls a priority’ (Al-Rasheed 2010: 117). He insisted ‘that all
Saudis should be provided with educational opportunities within an Islamic framework’
(Al-Munajjed 1997: 61–2), quoting the Qur‘an and sayings (hadith) of the Prophet
Muhammad to convince conservative elements that Islam does not oppose women’s
education. King Faisal persuaded the opposing religious scholars that education would
also contribute to girls’ Islamic education, making them better Muslim mothers
(Al-Munajjed 1997: 63). 3 Simultaneously, reports are known of several writers,
journalists, and poets who had also been calling for educating girls (Al-Rasheed
2013: 78). It was however not until the religious scholars confirmed that girls’
education was in accordance with Islam that conservative families started sending their
daughters to school (Al-Munajjed 1997: 64), albeit separate from boys. Education for
women, thus, is the first field in which the concept and practice of gender segregation in
the public domain was introduced.
The developing oil industry led to an increased demand for labour in the cities in
both the industrial and governmental sectors, which in turn led to a substantial number
of people moving into cities. Whereas in the rural areas both men and women worked
and contributed to the family income, urbanisation resulted in a significant increase in
men’s salaries (Le Renard 2008: 613). Female salaries were no longer needed to sustain
the family and women not working became a symbol of wealth and moral distinction
(Le Renard 2008: 613).
The rise of the Islamic awakening movement
Saudi Arabia’s economic and material development as well as the population’s wealth
reached unprecedented heights in the 1970s. Especially the rising oil prices as a result
of the 1973 oil crisis led to fast economic developments. It was also a period of quick
social changes that impacted the social structure of the country. But in 1979, angry at
the fast pace of development in the country, a group of rebels lead by Juhayman
al-‘Otaybi4 lay siege to the Grand Mosque of Mecca. They claimed that Saudi society
3 This debate also took place in Egypt, Iran and the Sudan in the first half of the 20th century. See also
Abu-Lughod ed., 1998 and Ahmed,1992.
4 A religious militant who believed that the Al-Sa‘ud had lost their legitimacy because of corruption and
imitation of the West.
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had become immoral due to western influences such as cinema, working women, and
sports, and that king Khalid (r. 1975–82) had not countered these developments. The
militants’ aim was to usher in a new age of purism. Hundreds of pilgrims were taken
hostage. The incident rocked the Saudi monarchy to its core, not in the least because
Saudi soldiers had to be aided by French commandos in order to end the siege.
As a consequence of the 1979 siege, ‘the Saudis tried to seal the connection between
themselves as rulers and adherence to a ‘one true Islam’ (Doumato 2009: 24). The
conservatism that flowed out of this often targeted women as culture bearers, as a
consequence of which their access to public spaces was curtailed (DeLong-Bas 2009:
19). Women started to dress more conservatively, donning cloaks (abayas) and the face
veil (niqab), and female presenters disappeared from Saudi TV screens (Doumato
2009: 23–4). More women-only spaces started to develop in the public domain, with
the first women-only branch of the al-Rajhi bank opening in Alshmaisi in 1979.
Three years after the siege, king Khalid died (r. 1975–82) and king Fahd (r. 1982–
2005) ascended to the throne. ‘Separation of the sexes and control of women by their
guardians5 blossomed over the next several years into tangible indicators of what it
meant to be Muslim, and the Saudi political leadership got behind the task of enforce-
ment’ (Doumato 2009: 24). During the 1980s, a period of consolidation, the Islamic
Awakening movement gained more and more ground, and more women-only public
spaces appeared (such as the afore-mentioned women-only banks), financed with oil
revenues, strengthening and diversifying the field of women-only public spaces.
The 1990–1991 gulf war, 9/11, and the national dialogue
In the run-up to the Gulf War, American troops arrived in Saudi Arabia, and American
female soldiers drove cars and army trucks. The presence of US troops on Saudi soil
during the Gulf War triggered strong opposition from prominent shaykhs such as
Salman al-‘Awda and Safar al-Hawali (ICG 2004: 5). At the same time, it partially
inspired forty-seven women to take the wheel in November 1990, protesting for their
right to drive. The religious police6 demanded punishment and the government took the
drivers’ passports and fired those who were teachers.
Although the Gulf War led to some political reforms such as the Basic Law of 19927
and the installation of the (appointed) consultative council (majlis al-shūrā) (Yamani
1996: 267), it also led to a heightened turn to conservatism, a trend that gained further
momentum later in the 1990s. In this playing field and in order to sustain itself at the
centre of contemporary politics in the kingdom, the Saudi monarchy had a continuing
need to reaffirm its legitimacy as an Islamic government. In this struggle, women’s
issues were pushed to centre stage:
5 In Saudi Arabia, every woman has a guardian (mahram). A guardian is a male family member (father,
brother, husband, son, or paternal uncle) whose permission a woman needs to, for example, work, travel, and
study.
6 The religious police is the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, colloquially
known as the muṭawa‘a or the hay’a. They have, amongst others, the power to enforce ‘proper Islamic dress’,
to arrest unrelated males and females caught socializing, and to enforce store closure during prayer time.
7 The Basic Law lays down the basic system of governance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia
Basic Law of Governance 1992). It does not override shari‘a, and article 1 of the Basic Law states that the
country’s constitution is the Qur’an and the sunna (traditions) of the Prophet Muhammad.
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One of the main characteristics of the contemporary political situation is that the
issue of women’s rights and behaviour has been placed at the centre of a potential
power struggle between the ‘ulama [religious scholars] and the state. The state
uses the role of women within society to make symbolic gestures to confirm its
commitment to Islam, for example by enforcing the wearing of the veil and the
legal ban on women driving cars and by limiting the choice young women have
in education and career choices, thus preserving the strict gender segregation in
all public spaces (Yamani 2000: 95).
According to Dekmejian, after the 1990–91 Gulf war, ‘Islam has become, once
again, a two-edged political instrument – as the Kingdom’s primary medium of self-
legitimisation, and as the main venue of protest for opposition elements’ (Dekmejian as
quoted in Yamani 2000: 116). It is in the second half of the 2000s that we particularly
see this playing out.
Within the context of those afore-mentioned demands for reform by various actors in
the 1990s, the events of 9/11 and the domestic terrorist attacks on Riyadh compounds
in 2003 and 2004 led to more pressure for reform - from outside as well as within the
Kingdom. Then-crown prince ‘Abdallah (r. 2005–2015) initiated the National
Dialogues.8 The third National Dialogue (2004) focused on women, their duties and
obligations, education, and participation in society and the labour market. Thirty-five
men and thirty-five women participated in the dialogue. At the meeting, which was
closed to the public, a clash seems to have taken place between those who oppose
women’s full participation in society and those who are ‘with’ women (Le Renard
2008: 619).
After the meetings, the participating women presented the same recommendations to
‘Abdallah’s wife, respecting and reinforcing the practice of gender segregation (Le
Renard 2008: 618). After ‘Abdallah’s agreement, the recommendations were published.
An interesting common feature of these recommendations is that ‘they do not question
gender segregation but rather reinforce it by suggesting the creation of more specific
institutions for women’ (Le Renard 2008: 619). The result of these recommendations
was mainly to ‘de-taboo’ the women’s issue and making the debate public with this
‘state approval’.
Gender segregation and public space in recent official Saudi Arabian discourses
It is from the early 2000s onwards that we see not only a further consolidation of
women-only public spaces, but also a demand for the practice of ikhtilāṭ. In order to
placate both conservatives and more liberal-minded reformists in the Kingdom, both
the developments of women-only public spaces and that of the practice of ikhtilāṭ in the
public domain were supported by the government – although the latter less strongly.
In 2009, king ‘Abdallah opened Saudi Arabia’s first co-ed university where ikhtilāṭ
would be practiced. The university, King ‘Abdallah University for Science and
Technology (KAUST) was built and financed by Saudi Aramco, the Saudi state oil
8 The National Dialogues serve as a platform for dialogue in the Kingdom, based on two pillars: the Islamic
shari‘a and national integrity. Also refer to the King ‘Abdulaziz Centre for National Dialogue (KACND) www.
kacnd.org.
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company, and led to a strong debate about ikhtilāṭ amongst others among religious
scholars.9 Six months after KAUST’s opening, the director of the Mecca office of the
religious police, Ahmad bin Qasim al-Ghamdi, gave an interview saying that ‘there was
nothing in Islam that prevents women and men from mixing in public places like
offices and schools’ (Gause 2010). Ahmad bin Baz, the son of former Grand Mufti10
shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Baz also publicly stated that there is a legitimate basis in
Islamic law for a more lenient position on ikhtilāṭ (Gause 2010).11
Other, more conservative scholars such as Sa‘d al-Shithri, a member of the Council
of Senior ‘Ulama’,12 are against a normalisation of ikhtilāṭ because it can lead to ‘a
massive evil’ such as ‘corruption’ (Meijer 2010: 14). Anything that can lead to that, i.e.
mixed education, should therefore be forbidden.
In September 2011, king ‘Abdallah announced the opening up of the consultative
council (majlis al-shūrā) to female members. He framed his decision as fitting with
Islamic history, in which he said women played an important role. He also stressed that
he had been advised on the matter by some of the country’s religious scholars. The
Grand Mufti, ‘Abdel ‘Aziz bin Shaykh, immediately publicly supported the king’s
decision. However, there was also opposition to the decision, and in January 2013, a
few weeks before the king was to swear in the new consultative council including its
female members, conservative scholars staged a protest outside the king’s palace in
Riyadh. While during the council’s inauguration in February 2013 the female members
sat in the same room as the male council members (though on a separate side), when in
session the female council members enter the council by a women-only entrance and
are seated in a room separate from their male counterparts.
Critics say that change is often more cosmetic and symbolic than substantive. King
‘Abdallah walked a tightrope, using Islam to legitimise the House of Sa‘ud’s rule while
at the same time it is one of the main avenues of opposition. ‘Abdallah’s strategy was
one of political decompression: to make just enough concessions to appease Saudi
Arabia’s subordinate and disheartened peoples and relieve pressure for reform’
(Yamani 2008: 144). It thus remains to be seen whether the (incremental) steps king
‘Abdallah took on the path of reform will substantiate and gain momentum among the
Saudi population under the new king Salman, or whether they will remain confined to
small ‘pockets’ within Saudi society.
What this section has shown is that gender segregation into women-only public
spaces has been implemented, institutionalised, and reinforced by processes of eco-
nomic transition, education, urbanisation, and the influence of the Islamic Awakening
movement, while especially since the second half of the 2000s a simultaneous devel-
opment towards more ikhtilāṭ can be traced. On the one hand, the state uses the role of
women within society to make gestures that confirm its commitment to Islam,
supporting the development of women-only public spaces. On the other hand, it allows
for the emergence of more ikhtilāṭ in the public domain.
9 See also Meijer 2010.
10 The Grand Mufti is the most influential religious authority in the Kingdom and is appointed by the king.
11 From previous government stances it may be expected that ‘any substantive change in Saudi policies on
women’s roles in society will be justified and explained by the government in terms of Islam’ (Gause 2010).
making al-Ghamdi and Bin Baz’ statements all the more interesting.
12 The Council of Senior ‘Ulama’ (hay’at kibar al-‘ulama’) is Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior Scholars, and
is the country’s highest religious body. It is one of the bodies that advises the King.
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We saw how the Saudi government balances its position among the various
contesting streams in society by initiating both projects that support women-only public
spaces and projects that support ikhtilāṭ. In doing so the state, with the power that it has,
creates a field of legitimacy that interlocutors can engage with, position themselves
towards, and relate to. Turning now to our interlocutors, we will see observe how both
these trends and attitudes towards women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ are reflected
in their personal views.
Interlocutors’ views on public participation: from women-only public
spaces to ikhtilāṭ to khilwa
In the previous section we saw that the issues of women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ
are core issues in the Saudi debate on the participation of women in the public domain
in the Kingdom. In this section, then, I will explore my interlocutors’ views on
segregation, ikhtilāṭ, and khilwa. Firstly, I will discuss these concepts. Secondly, we
will take a close look at the attitudes of my interlocutors towards segregation, ikhtilāṭ,
and khilwa. Thirdly, I will shed light on the strategies that my interlocutors employ in
dealing therewith in their daily lives.
We will see reflected in the discourses of my interlocutors those of the Saudi
state and religious actors. This illustrates the point that the Saudi state tries to
balance the various streams in society and shows an interplay between all these
actors, with the state through its inherent power determining the field of
legitimacy in which those discourses can take place. This means interlocutors
too relate themselves to the phenomena of women-only public spaces and
ikhtilāṭ.
Contested concepts: segregation, ikhtilāṭ and khilwa
Gender segregation – and its opposite, ikhtilāṭ – are ambiguous and contested
concepts and practices, while with khilwa this is not the case. My interlocutors
had well-articulated yet divergent ideas about what the former two concepts
actually mean.
From an outsider’s perspective, one would consider the situation in Saudi Arabia
regarding the relations between men and women in the public domain as gender
segregation. However, as was discussed, in Saudi Arabia itself the public discussion
focuses on the concept and practice of ikhtilāṭ: the mixing of the sexes. It is interesting
to note here that unlike the word ikhtilāṭ for ‘mixing’, the spoken Arabic language does
not have one word for segregation. When asked for a word in Arabic that denotes
‘segregation’, most interlocutors had to think for a while, to then come up with words
such as infiṣāl, faṣl, iqsām, ḥājiz, and ḥijāb, all denoting variations of the English word
‘separation’, while immediately adding ‘but we do not really use this word’, indicating
that these are artificial descriptions:
Euhm... euhm.... No I don’t know. I’m not sure. The opposite of mixing
[ikhtilāṭ]… it’s separation [al-faṣl]… but it’s not a term we really use. Faṣl...
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you have to add words, like separation between men and women [faṣl bayn ar-
rijāl wa-l-nisā’].13
The fact that gender segregation is ‘the norm’ or ‘default’ in Saudi society and
ikhtilāṭ the issue of public debate is thus reflected in the spoken Saudi Arabic: no word
exists that is actually used for ‘gender segregation’. It is interesting to note here that in
the English language, no word exists in the spoken language that is actually used for
‘mixing’. Rather, we speak of ‘segregation’, denoting the separation between the sexes.
Also conceptually, ‘segregation’ is not necessarily a clear notion when referring to a
practice. For example, for some interlocutors a screen between men and women in a
conference room amounts to segregation, because the screen divides the room into a
male and a female section, each with their own entrance but with a shared view of the
stage. For other interlocutors, however, this qualifies as ikhtilāṭ, as the men and women
are present in the same room and might mingle during breaks.
Ikhtilāṭ also is not a straightforward notion. Ibtisām, a female activist from Jeddah
who has worked on women’s issues all her life recounted her experience at the Fifth
Jeddah Economic Forum of 2005, where she proposed that with all the talk and debate
about ikhtilāṭ there should be an official definition of what ikhtilāṭ is and is not, so that
everyone knows what is being talked about when the word ikhtilāṭ is mentioned. She
made the same proposal during the 2007 Economic Forum.14 As a result of these
proposals, she said, the issue of ikhtilāṭ was taken up in the seventh National Dialogue,
on work and employment, which took place in 2008. Nevertheless, Ibtisām said, the
term still has not been officially defined.
In a similar vein, Su‘ād a business woman from Khobar recounted the story of her
husband having to visit the office of the religious police, as their business was accused
of employing ‘a female waiter’ and allowing ‘a lot of mixing’. She said her husband
entered the office, found five men of the religious police sitting at a round table, and
asked:
What would you like us to do so you don’t shut our store down? They [the five
men of the religious police] had no answer. Everybody had a different opinion
[on what ikhtilāṭ is], and that is the major problem when it comes to ikhtilāṭ in a
public place. It’s subjective because there’s no consensus and there’s nothing
written, and they won’t write it down for you [what ikhtilāṭ is/is not]. They will
not put it in writing because each and every one has a different opinion.15
Both examples illustrate that the use and meaning of the term ikhtilāṭ in the public
debate and conversations is ambiguous. At the same time, many interlocutors said that
in the Arabic language there is an understanding of the word ikhtilāṭ as literally
meaning ‘mixing’. For example, mixing several ingredients to bake a cake. Khadīja,
a young female Islamic teacher from Jeddah explained it as follows:
13 Interview with Mai, business woman, Jeddah, 21 September 2011.
14 Interview with Ibtisām, activist, Jeddah, 21 September 2011.
15 Interview with Su‘ād, business woman, Dammam, 24 September 2011.
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In the language, it is you and me right now. I can sit with you, laugh with you, eat
with you. That is ikhtilāṭ in the language. It doesn’t have anything to do with
Islam. Any ikhtilāṭ. Also between women. Even with – excuse me – animals. I
mix with them. I am in one place, and a cat sits next to me. That’s ikhtilāṭ.16
Most interlocutors indicated that the basic definition of ikhtilāṭ is the mixing ofmore
than one man and one woman in a public place such as a mall, the street, or in a
hospital. It is this definition of ikhtilāṭ that this article employs.
A much less contested phenomenon than ikhtilāṭ is khilwa. The basic definition of
khilwa is a woman and a non-maḥram man being together in a closed space (a maḥram
is a woman’s male guardian who is either a direct blood relation or her husband). Some
interlocutors added to that ‘where no one sees you’, so that a glass window separating
the man and woman from a larger group of people would not amount to khilwa. Some
interlocutors said that being in the car with the driver amounts to khilwa, because the
car is a closed space and they are alone with him, while others say it is not a situation of
khilwa because the car has windows (although often tinted) and moves around in a
public space.
While disagreement exists among women whether ikhtilāṭ is or is not allowed, and
should or should not be a larger part of public life in Saudi Arabia, consensus exists on
the rejection of khilwa. The measurement seems to be whether or not contact between
the man and the woman can – through the situation of khilwa – lead to relations
(‘alaqāt) or adultery (zina) that are both regarded as illicit. It is these relations, adultery,
and societal chaos (fitna) that need to be prevented. One of Wahhabism’s judicial pillars
is ‘the blocking of the means’ (sadd al-dhara’i), meaning that actions that could lead to
committing sins such as extra-marital relations and adultery must not be permitted.
Interlocutor’s ideas as to how to ‘block the means’ range from allowing women’s
participation in the public domain only through women-only spaces, to believing that
ikhtilāṭ is legitimate, to expressing the desire to prevent khilwa. This clearly indicates a
lack of interest in illicit relations on the part of interlocutors and rather shows that the
debate is about what constitutes legitimate access to public space for them.
Since the issue of khilwa is much less ambiguous among interlocutors than segre-
gation and ikhtilāṭ, the following section will not deal with khilwa. Similarly, the debate
in Saudi Arabia itself centres around ikhtilāṭ and not segregation. Therefore, in the
following section I will discuss those differing attitudes towards ikhtilāṭ.
Interlocutors’ attitudes towards ikhtilāṭ
In this section I will explore the diversity of attitudes towards ikhtilāṭ that my
interlocutors displayed, illustrating their views by the ways in which they look at its
practice. Three main categories of attitudes towards ‘mixing’ can be discerned among
interlocutors: a minority believes ikhtilāṭ is unacceptable, while the second (majority)
group thinks ikhtilāṭ is acceptable but only under certain conditions and circumstances.
A (small) third group accepts and seems to actively promote ikhtilāṭ.
The first group, consisting of a minority of interlocutors, most of whom were located
in Riyadh, were of the opinion that ikhtilāṭ is an unacceptable practice. Most
16 Interview with Khadīja, dā’iya, Jeddah, 20 September 2011.
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interlocutors indicated that Riyadh is generally more ‘conservative’ than Jeddah and
that this can explain the attitude. Their main reasons for regarding ikhtilāṭ as an
unacceptable practice are linked to ideas about the nature of men and women; customs
and traditions (‘adāt wa taqalīd); and Islamic history. As to the nature of men and
women, there exists the idea that men may not be able to control themselves when
working with women. As Najla’, a young working woman from Jeddah stated: ‘I
would not want to work with men in the same room. [...] Men make stupid moves.’17
Maysa, a da’iya from Riyadh, also does not want to work with men and made a
conscious decision to work only with women, and uses a similar argument as Najla’.
Maysa said:
For me it’s a conscious choice to work in a non-mixed environment, only with
other women. In my opinion it is much safer and much easier to work without
men. Ikhtilāṭ would cause a lot of problems, such as rape. Countries where men
and women work together there is a high percentage of rapes.18
So both Najla’ and Maysa argue that working with men lead to problems such as
(sexual) harassment of various degrees. To them, therefore ikhtilāṭ is not an acceptable
practice.
Regarding customs and traditions, interlocutors indicated that outside of Saudi
Arabia, ikhtilāṭ would not be a problem for them, because people are used to it there
– which is not the case in Saudi Arabia, where they say customs and traditions
discourage ikhtilāṭ, and that should be respected. As such, ikhtilāṭ is not positioned
as an acceptable practice in the Kingdom.
As to Islamic history, some interlocutors who are against ikhtilāṭ refer to Islamic
history to support their standpoint, stating that mixing was not allowed at the time of
the Prophet Muhammad. They say that for example in the Prophet’s mosque prayer was
separate, with the men praying in front and the women at the back. Interestingly, some
of the interlocutors who are in favour of ikhtilāṭ also refer to Islamic history to support
their standpoint, stating that mixing was allowed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad.
They too give the example of prayer in the Prophet’s mosque, saying that the men
would pray in front and women at the back, but that as they were praying in the same
space this was not segregation but ikhtilāṭ.
The second group, composed of the majority of interlocutors, and especially in
Jeddah, was of the opinion that ikhtilāṭ is acceptable under certain conditions and/or
circumstances. Due to its character as a port and a hub for the pilgrimage receiving
Muslims from all over the world, Jeddah is more open and, many interlocutors say,
more open-minded and ‘progressive’. The conditions and circumstances under which
ikhtilāṭ should be allowed have a dimension of necessity; and a dimension of ‘the
Islamic regulations’ (ḍawābiṭ al-shar‘iyya), expressed in ideas about behaviour; and of
dress.
The first dimension is that of necessity (ḍarūra). The state of ḍarūra is.‘used to
denote what may be called the technical state of necessity, and a wider sense (...)
17 Interview with Najlaʾ, young working woman, Jeddah, 26 June 2010.
18 Interview with Maysa, da’iya, Riyadh, 27 January 2011.
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to describe the necessities or demands of social and economic life’ (Encyclopae-
dia of Islam).
The state of ḍarūra is a state of necessity that allows someone to omit something
that is required, or commit something that is not allowed in Islam. This means that if the
necessities of the social or economic life demand it, someone may do something that
under other circumstances they would not (be allowed to) do. ‘Omnia, a thirty-four year
old working woman who holds a university lectureship, teaching only women, said she
was against ikhtilāṭ in general but that when it came to necessities such as medical
treatment in hospitals she did not have a problem with it: ‘if there is no choice, then a
male doctor is fine in Islam because it is something necessary.’19 ‘Omnia invokes
necessity to legitimise the practice of ikhtilāṭ, which she is however principally against.
With respect to the second dimension of the rules and moral checks of the shari’a
(ḍawābiṭ al-shar‘iyya), most interlocutors who agree with ikhtilāṭ within certain limits
indicate that they are fine with the practice as long as the woman guards her behaviour
and dress. Islamic Studies teacher Khadīja for example refers to this as ḍawābiṭ al-
shar‘iyya:
It [ikhtilāṭ] is not bad when I adhere to the rules and moral checks of the shari’a
[ḍawābiṭ al-shar‘iyya] that God has sent to us. I have rules and laws. And I have
to walk with those so that I don’t end up in forbidden ikhtilāṭ [ikhtilāṭmuḥarram].
Because there is also permitted ikhtilāṭ [ikhtilāṭ masmūḥ].20
Here, permitted ikhtilāṭ is ikhtilāṭ within the ḍawābiṭ al-shar‘iyya. For Khadīja,
these regulations are proper dress – wearing the cloak (abaya) and the face veil (niqab)
when going outside the house – and displaying proper behaviour: no laughing and
joking but only a formal way of dealing with men. In that way, when holding on to
these limits, the potential for illicit relations to occur is eliminated. Khadīja explains
that forbidden ikhtilāṭ is the type of ikhtilāṭ that does not meet those regulations. It is a
way of mixing with men that can lead to improper behaviour and relations.
The last category of those interlocutors who support actively promoting ikhtilāṭ is
quite rare. Only very few interlocutors mention that they have stimulated ikhtilāṭ, and
then in an indirect way. Hayat, a woman in her early thirties who used to teach business
studies at King ‘Abdulaziz University in Jeddah said she encouraged ikhtilāṭ through
her teaching. She said she used to discuss ikhtilāṭ in her lectures at university, saying
that it is natural and no problem for a woman to be in ikhtilāṭ. She said she thought that
she influenced her students with her attitude and examples.21 Jihan, a middle-aged
business woman from Jeddah who employs both men and women, also seems to
stimulate ikhtilāṭ in an indirect way:
In my business we are mixed in my office. The women are in a separate room.
Because this is what they want, the government, and if they come and check in
19 Interview with ‘Omnia, young working woman, Riyadh, 15 June 2010.
20 Interview with Khadīja, dā’iya, Jeddah, 20 September 2011.
21 Interview with Hayat, young working woman, Jeddah, 10 June 2010
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the office I am in the legal area, not doing anything wrong. But the meetings are
mixed, and the girls sit with the men finishing their reports. They sit together at
the computers finishing their accounting. This is how it should be.22
This practice should be specified in the business license: only women-only busi-
nesses can be run directly by women themselves and without a male director, and men
are not allowed to enter the business. However, this business woman runs her business
herself yet allows ikhtilāṭ. By dodging the regulations,23 thereby risking to be shut
down, this woman indirectly promotes ikhtilāṭ by allowing it on her work floor without
having the necessary documents and status to back up the practice.
So the attitudes of my interlocutors towards to the actual use of mixed as well as
women-only public spaces varied. Again, the small sample size does not allow me to
draw meaningful conclusions based on interlocutors’ different backgrounds. What we
did see however is that interlocutors who are based in Jeddah are more likely to believe
that ikhtilāṭ is acceptable and permissible under certain circumstances than interlocutors
who are located in Riyadh, who are more likely to be against ikhtilāṭ.24 This can be
explained by the fact that generally Jeddah is more ‘open’ than Riyadh and that
therefore it is understandable that Jeddah-based interlocutors are more inclined towards
a more lenient stance vis-à-vis ikhtilāṭ.
The common denominator though is participation in the public domain, and whether
this should take place in a mixed (mukhtalaṭ) manner or through public spaces that are
only-for-women. In the following section I will show that strategies as to how to
achieve this participation vary.
Interlocutors’ strategies regarding their participation in the public domain
The strategies that interlocutors put forward to achieve participation in the public
domain vary. These strategies are not only related to ikhtilāṭ as a way to participate in
the public domain but mainly to the use of women-only public spaces.While most of the
debate in Saudi Arabia is about the phenomenon of ikhtilāṭ it is, after all, women-only
public spaces that are the dominant mode of women’s participation in the public domain.
Here, I will discern four types of strategies to negotiate women-only public spaces.
A first, majority, group of interlocutors prefers to keep the status quo vis-à-vis women-
only public spaces. A second, small group, wishes to increase the presence of women-
only public spaces in and of itself. A third, minority group of interlocutors wants to
increase the number of women-only public spaces as an intermediary phase towards
more ikhtilāṭ. And finally a fourth, small group of interlocutors seems to undermine the
presence of women-only public spaces.
Firstly, most interlocutors believe that the status quo is desirable, and that they have
neither a desire for more ikhtilāṭ nor a desire for more women-only public spaces.
When asked whether she would like to see more or less women-only public spaces in
22 Interview with Jihan, business woman, Jeddah, 21 September 2011.
23 The Labour Law of 1969 forbade ikhtilāṭ in places of work while at the same time it regulated and
legitimised the presence of women in the public sphere into women-only offices where men were not allowed
to enter. The Labor Law was amended in 2005 through Royal Decree No. M/51 and no longer mentions
forbiddance of ikhtilāṭ. Nevertheless, in practice the situation is not always clear. See also Le Renard 2014, 46.
24 For the Eastern Province, the sample was too small to be able to comment.
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society, Muna25 answered no. She indicated that she wants to work in a women-only
environment and that she made a conscious choice for such an organisation, but added
that if it is a good position, she would work with men, because to her working is about
achieving her dreams. At the same time, Muna does not see a need for an expansion of
women-only workplaces. Her attitude is a pragmatic one: while her choice for working
in a women-only office was conscious, her central argument is not a desire not to work
with men but a desire to develop her potential.
Secondly, some interlocutors put forward that women-only spaces are their preferred
way of interaction, and that they would like to see more of those spaces. For example,
they would like to have more women-only malls, arguing that it would make them feel
more relaxed and at ease being able to shop and work without wearing their abayas.
Not only women call for more women-only public spaces. In January 2011, a group
of Saudi shaykhs and doctors launched a petition calling for the building of women-
only hospitals, so that women would have the opportunity of avoiding men when
needing medical attention, and so that female doctors would be prevented from mixing
with men. Female doctors also signed the petition that was submitted to the Ministry of
Health and the consultative council (majlis al-shūrā) (Sa‘ud Sa’ud 2011). Most
interlocutors however rejected the idea of women-only hospitals, stating that mixing
in hospitals is something natural. Others argued that mixing in hospitals is necessary,
because there are not enough specialised female doctors to avoid mixing. If there is no
choice, receiving treatment from a male doctor is fine because the treatment is
necessary. Most of the interlocutors who were in favour of this idea of women-only
hospitals added that the project would anyway be unfeasible due to a lack of enough
qualified specialised female doctors.26
Thirdly, a minority of interlocutors believe there should be an increase in women-
only public spaces as an intermediary phase towards more ikhtilāṭ. From this point of
view, more women-only spaces will make society used to women’s presence in areas
where currently women are not active. Najla’, a young working woman from Jeddah,
illustrated this standpoint as follows:
A separate transportation system has to be made, like separate roads for men and
women. Or the roads should be made available to men and women at separate
hours. Until people get used to it, then they can make roads or hours together.27
Najla’ reasons that the increased presence of women in the public domain – albeit
separate from men – would increase society’s comfort with women’s presence in those
areas, at which point society can and should move towards ikhtilāṭ rather than segre-
gation of women into women-only public spaces. In the case of separate roads for men
and women, society would know of and see in the public domain these separate roads,
allowing people to get used to women driving. Once society is indeed used to it, men
and women should be able to drive on the same road or at the same time. From this
point of view, women-only public spaces are seen as instrumental and as a phenomenon
that will eventually be dismantled.
25 Interview with Muna, young working woman, Jeddah, 19 June 2011.
26 Such as for example Ahlam, dā‘iya (and medical doctor), Riyadh, 25 January 2011.
27 Interview with Najla’, young working woman, Jeddah, 26 June 2011.
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Finally, a small number of interlocutors believe that the presence of women-only
public spaces should be undermined immediately without any other phases, and put this
attitude into practice by their behaviour. Daliya, a young business woman from Jeddah
said about going to the Chamber of Commerce to arrange formalities for her business:
I don’t like to go to the women’s section. So I go to the men’s section and they let
me in.28
By displaying this type of behaviour, and by getting away with it in this environ-
ment, Daliya not only makes a clear statement with regards to her own opinion on
ikhtilāṭ and women-only public spaces, but also tries to re-shape the boundaries of the
permissible and acceptable.
Liberation, empowerment, and the rise of women
Conversations about women’s public participation led me to ask questions such as how
interlocutors relate to concepts of ‘empowerment’, ‘women’s liberation’, and ‘the rise of
women’. The concepts of ‘women in development’ (Würth 2003). ‘autonomy’ and also
‘empowerment’ have been debated for their (un)suitability for Arab women. Whereas the
first Arab Human Development Report (2002) by the United Nations Development
Agency (UNDP) used the terminology ‘women’s empowerment,’ (UNDP, 2002) in the
2005 Report – written by Arab scholars, policy makers, and practitioners and entirely
devoted to the position of women in the Arab World – the descriptive term ‘the rise of
women’ is preferred (UNDP, 2005). Here, we must acknowledge the discursive power of
these concepts, that are often used in an international context while foregoing consider-
ation of whether or not they find fertile ground outside a western framework. Thus, in
interviews, I presented my interlocutors with the terms ‘liberation of women’(taḥrīr al-
mar’a), ‘empowerment’ (tamkīn al- mar’a), and ‘the rise of women’ (nuhuḍ al-mar’a) in
order to find out whether and if so to what extent these terms resonate with them. Do these
terms have meaning to them, and if so how do they use them in the Saudi context, or do
interlocutors have another way of approaching these issues?
The concepts of ‘liberation of women’, ‘empowerment’, and the ‘rise of women’
The ‘liberation of women’ (taḥrīr al-mar’a) has, for most interlocutors, a negative
connotation. The term seems to denote the moral decline of the woman as a person (by
for example, ‘free relations’ with men) and of society as a whole (by for example, the
breakdown of the family). Only one interlocutor, an activist, said she found the ideas
that she read in Qasim Amin’s 1899 book ‘The Liberation of Women’ (Taḥrīr al-
mar’a) useful in order to reclaim Islamic history and the role of women therein.29 She
related the story of how she had brought the book into Saudi Arabia from Egypt, as the
28 Interview with Daliya, business woman, Jeddah, 17 June 2010.
29 In his 1899 book ‘The Liberation of Women’ (Taḥrīr al-mar’a), Qasim Amin advocated the modification of
Egyptian laws on, amongst others, divorce and polygamy, supporting his arguments by using verses from the
Qur’an.
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book is not allowed to be sold in the Kingdom (and thus does not have a wide
readership).
The concept of ‘empowerment’ has been literally translated into Arabic as tamkīn al-
mar’a and is a term that several interlocutors say comes from the United Nations.
Almost all activists, as well as most business women, immediately recognised the term
and were able to articulate what it means to them without further prompting. The term
did not resonate immediately with all Islamic preachers and teachers, but after a little
prompting they too were able to describe what they understand empowerment to be. To
my interlocutors, empowerment consists of participation in public life, education, and
economic empowerment.
According to my interlocutors, a central feature of empowerment is participation in
public life: for example that a woman can become a Minister, a doctor, or a judge.30
Working, and for some holding public office is a sign of empowerment – not only of
women themselves but also of society as a whole: some interlocutors frame empow-
erment not only as beneficial for herself or other women, but also to the rest of society.
Many of my interlocutors define access to education to be part of empowerment or
even as its basis. The argument is that it is only with education that women can ascend
on the ladder of public life and public office, and only through education that they can
become decision-makers.
One activist said that she had made a conscious decision to focus on economic rather
than social or political empowerment of women. She stated that she had chosen to
focus on economic empowerment because tamkin al-mar’a starts with financial aware-
ness and ability.31
Finally, I discussed with my interlocutors the term ‘the rise of women’ (nuhuḍ al-
mar’a). This term was used in the 2005 Arab Human Development Report as a
suggested alternative to the term ‘empowerment’. The ‘rise of women’ was not a term
that was immediately recognised and understood by most interlocutors. However, it
was a term that resonated immediately with almost all of them. When presented with
the term ‘rise of women’, some interlocutors reformulated it to ‘the renaissance/rebirth
of women’ (nahḍat al-mar’a) and immediately gave a definition of it. Awareness
(wā‘i), and especially of awareness of the world around oneself and the awareness of
rights, is an important component of ‘the rise of women’.
Interlocutors also referred to the rise of women as ‘the period in which we are now’
and of the participation of women (mushtarakat al-mar’a), namely that women are
increasingly participating in the public life. The September 2011 decision of king
Abdallah to allow women to participate in the next round of the consultative council
and the next municipal elections was often mentioned in this context.
In short, the term empowerment finds fertile ground mainly with the activists, and is
defined mainly as participation in public life, education, and economic independence.
Many of those activists are internationally connected and much aware of UN reports,
and thus also of the terms that are used in those contests. The concept of the ‘rise of
women’ is less known but resonates immediately with the majority of interlocutors, and
is more broadly viewed as ‘awareness of rights’ and ‘participation in society’.
Importantly, central to both ideas is the participation of women (mushtarakat al-mar’a)
30 While women can study Islamic law and practice as lawyers, they cannot become judges.
31 Interview with Sanaʾ, activist, Jeddah, 19 September 2011.
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in society, in public space. Interlocutors express those ideas much more in relation to
the concept of ikhtilāṭ, as we saw, and women-only public spaces, as strategies for
achieving women’s public participation.
Towards a ‘modern Saudi woman’
So far, it has become clear that both women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ are central
to ideas about women’s participation in public spaces in Saudi Arabia. As Deeb (2006)
puts forward, gender is a basic component of discourses about being modern, and it is
‘one of the central modalities through which modernity is imagined and desired’ (Rofel
1999: 20). Women have historically played an important role as national and as cultural
symbols, and are during transitional periods in a country’s development often either
linked to modernity or to tradition (Moghadam 2003: 105). This especially touches
upon the female body, which is often a central site of political difference and of
resistance to and critique of forces of Western modernity (Göle 1996: 1). Gendered
power has and can take on many different forms (Abu-Lughod 1998), and the body,
‘(…) as Michel Foucault puts it, is the locus of all struggles of power, which works by
the organization and division of space.’ (Göle 1996: 9). Dividing space into mixed and
only-for-women spaces, gender segregation can be seen as both a regulatory and as an
‘emancipatory’ process. Gender segregation can be regulatory in that it determines
which spaces are and which are not accessible to women, determining in which spaces
they can and cannot participate in public life and develop activities. At the same time,
they can be ‘emancipatory’ in that women-only public spaces can open up spaces to
women that otherwise would remain closed to them if these did not exist; for example,
women-only workplaces that can serve as a mechanism of inclusion rather than
exclusion, enabling women to work as they would not have wanted to or be allowed
to had the workplace been mixed.
Gender segregation is often perceived to be a consequence of tradition and conser-
vatism of society. Abu-Lughod (1998) and Le Renard (2008). though, argue that
‘reference to the traditional does not help us to understand the persistence and consol-
idation of gender segregation’ (Le Renard 2008: 610). The ‘modernism-traditionalism
dichotomy’ relegates ‘women’s domesticity to the realm of conservatism and tradition
and labels women’s emergence into the public sphere, whether in politics, employment,
or education, as radical and new’ (Abu-Lughod 1998: vii).
Göle argues that there is a continuous back-and-forth between affirming authenticity
and the globalisation of modernity (Göle 2000: 92). She argues that this authenticity is
not formulated in a political, cultural, and social vacuum but rather is formulated in a
joint attempt to redefine that authenticity in a way that ‘is no longer apologetic before
Western modernity’ (Göle 2000: 96).
Nonetheless, the discursive power of the West and people’s relationship thereto,
should not be underestimated As Lara Deeb formulated it, ideas about what is and is
not modern, as well as judgements about that spring from various kinds of media ‘and
are backed by political, economic, and military power (Deeb 2006: 25). Indeed, as
Deeb argues, it is almost impossible not to see Europe as a point of reference, if only
due to cultural permeation through technology, satellite, and internet. But while Europe
may still be a point of reference – ‘a person, community, place, or thing is always
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modern as compared to some other thing, an other that is defined in the comparison as
not modern or less modern’ (Deeb 2006: 17) - modernisation is no longer equalled to
Westernisation but rather dissociated from it. At the same time, this modernity can
capture its own-ness, in a mode that is regarded as ‘authentic’ by those who live and
experience this modernity.
As became clear in the historical overview, some state actors describe ‘progress’ and
‘modernity’ in their own way, legitimising women-only public spaces with an Islamic
discourse, but how do women themselves view this? Do they view women-only public
spaces as ‘modern’, or is, in their perspective, ikhtilāṭ part of this modernity?
When asked whether Saudi Arabia is a modern country, and to define that moder-
nity, almost all interlocutors put forward the same characteristics. While technological
inventions such as internet, cars and airplanes, but also scientific progress and certain
research methodologies were identified to be central to modernity, so was Islam.
Ḥanān, an activist for example, said that ‘the idea that religion would not be part of
modernity is an ignorant idea.’ 32 To almost all interlocutors, Islam sets the limits
(ḥudūd) of modernity:
The internet, the Blackberry or the computer, they’re not forbidden [ḥarām] in the
religion. You use them, but with limits [bī ḥudūd]. For example, I use my mobile
for relations with my family, with my children. But not for forbidden relations
[‘alaqāt muḥarrima], for the opposite of family relations. That is from the
religion.33
Material progress, most women I spoke with argue, must take place within the limits
and framework of Islam and its interpretations. As such, modernity has both a material
and a religious dimension.
The majority of interlocutors make a distinction between modernisation and west-
ernisation (taghrīb). Westernisation is most often defined as copy-pasting whatever
comes from America or Europe: food, clothes, speech, and morals. Most women I
spoke with reject the (perceived) secularity of the state and society, and only very few
proposed a separation of religion and the state. ‘Liberation of women’, either men-
tioned literally or described as such, is associated with westernisation. Most interloc-
utors who include the women’s issue in their description of westernisation reject the
idea of women being able to have relations outside of the framework of marriage.
Modernisation, on the other hand, is taking ‘the positive, good things34 from them [the
west] and leaving the bad things that the religion does not agree with.’35 As such, the
majority of women I spoke with indicate that they consider Saudi Arabia to be a
modern Islamic country.
When asked whether ikhtilāṭ, or women-only public spaces, or both are part of that
modernity, varying responses came. An activist, who works on women’s issues for a
charity, was adamant that ‘segregation [faṣl] is part of modernity [ḥadātha] and
32 Interview with Ḥanān, activist, Jeddah, 20 September 2011.
33 Interview with Jamīla and Nūr, dā’iyāt, Jeddah, 19 September 2011. Quote: Nūr.
34 Earlier on in the interview, Khadīja had mentioned what those ‘good things’ are: ‘Look, I can use a mobile
phone. It is modern. Facebook, it is modern. Internet, cars, planes, cameras, air conditioning…So I can take
things from modernity that go with the ḍawābiṭ.’
35 Interview with Khadīja, dā’iya, Jeddah, 20 September 2011.
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development [taṭawwur]. For example, this meeting [a women-only meeting of the
charity she volunteers for], is not that development? But if there were men here it
would not be development [taṭawwur] at all.36 Ḥanān here says that she believes that
men and women would be preoccupied with each other rather than the content of the
meeting. But another woman I interviewed, a dā‘iya, stated that not women-only public
spaces but ikhtilāṭ is part of modernity – but only if the woman wears her headscarf
(ḥijāb) and if both the man and the woman respect themselves and their limits.37
Interlocutors’ notion of modernity thus does not consist only of material progress
(education, infrastructure, gadgets) but also has a spiritual, religious dimension, leading
us to Lara Deeb’s ‘enchanted modern’ (Deeb 2006). It is the duality of material
progress and religiosity that constitutes ‘the Saudi modern’ of which women’s public
participation, through ikhtilat as well as through women-only public spaces, is a
component.
Conclusion
This article has, firstly, attempted to show how the developments of women-only public
spaces and ikhtilāṭ are tied to the historical development of Saudi Arabia. It was shown
that especially since the second part of the 2000s, the state has also supported both
developments in the public domain in an attempt to appease the various streams in
society and as one way of consolidating its own position as the ruling family.
Interlocutors have adopted as well as challenged these developments. This article
demonstrated that the concepts of segregation and ikhtilāṭ are ambiguous and contested
by various actors, including and importantly, interlocutors themselves. They negotiate
their daily realities with regards to women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ while
(re)producing or contesting women-only public spaces. Their strategies when dealing
with women-only public spaces and ikhtilāṭ vary from wanting to keep the status quo;
wishing to strengthen women-only public spaces; strengthening them as an intermedi-
ary phase towards more ikhtilāṭ, or attempting to undermine them.
I argued that women are often considered to be ‘culture bearers,’ and as such the
women’s issue is an area in which notions of progress and modernity are negotiated.
Interlocutors actively engaged in giving meaning to modernity. Their perception of
modernity does not consist only of material progress (e.g. internet, television, mobile
phones, infrastructure) but also has a religious dimension grounded in Islam, leading to
what Lara Deeb (2006) has called an ‘enchanted modern’.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
36 Interview with Ḥanān, activist, Jeddah, 20 September 2011.
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